Book Review: Adam Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments

My notes on Adam Smith theory of moral sentiments

Wow, having listened to this book on audio in 2015, I realized that we all are part of ONE, as Adam Smith so well described this in his first book "Theory of Moral Sentiments" written in 1759. A review of my reading notes allowed me to summarize some of the knowledge acquired since.

The Theory of Moral Sentiments written by Adam Smith (1759) provided the ethical, philosophical, psychological, and methodological underpinnings to Smith's later works, including The Wealth of Nations (1776), Essays on Philosophical Subjects (1795), and Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenue, and Arms (1763) (first published in 1896).

Table of Contents

The book consists of 6 parts which cover ideas on 1) the propriety of (our) action; 2)  merit and demerit; or the objects of reward and punishment; 3) the foundations of our judgments concerning our own sentiments and conduct, and of the sense of duty; 4) the effect of utility upon the sentiments of approbation; 5) the influence of custom and fashion upon the sentiments of moral approbation and disapprobation; 6) systems of moral philosophy.

Part I: Of the propriety of the action consists of three sections: 1) the sense of propriety; 2) the degrees of which different passions are consistent with propriety; 3) the effects of prosperity and adversity upon the judgment of mankind with regard to the propriety of action, and why it is easier to obtain their approbation in the one state than the other;.
On the Sense of Propriety (Section 1), we note that it consists of 5 chapters which cover concepts of 1) sympathy; 2) the pleasure of mutual sympathy; 3) the manner in which we judge of the propriety or impropriety of the affections of other men by their concord or dissonance with our own; 4) the continued discussion of the same subject, and finally, 5) the amiable and respectable virtues.
According to Smith, humans have a natural tendency to care about the well-being of others for no other reason than the pleasure one gets from seeing them happy. He calls this sympathy, defining it as "our fellow-feeling with any passion whatsoever" (p. 5). He argues that this occurs under either of two conditions: 1) We see firsthand the fortune or misfortune of another person; 2) The fortune or misfortune is vividly depicted to us. Although this is apparently true, he follows to argue that this tendency lies even in "the greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of society" (p. 2).
Smith also proposes several variables that can moderate the extent of sympathy, noting that the situation that is the cause of the passion is the large determinant of our response. An important point put forth by Smith is that the degree to which we sympathize, or "tremble and shudder at the thought of what he feels", is proportional to the degree of vividness in our observation or the description of the event.

• Knowledge of the causes of the emotions: sympathetic responses are often conditional on—or their magnitude is determined by—the causes of the emotion in the person being sympathized with.

• Whether other people are involved in the emotion:  intrapersonal emotions trigger at least some sympathy without the need for context, whereas interpersonal emotions are dependent on context.

• Smith makes clear that we sympathize not only with the misery of others but also the joy; he states that observing an emotional state through the "looks and gestures" in another person is enough to initiate that emotional state in ourselves.

• On the sense of Pleasure and mutual sympathy, Smith argues that "not only do we get pleasure from the sympathy of others, but we also obtain pleasure from being able to successfully sympathize with others, and discomfort from failing to do so." Sympathizing is pleasurable, failing to sympathize is aversive. Smith also makes the case that failing to sympathize with another person may not be aversive to ourselves but we may find the emotion of the other person unfounded and blame them, as when another person experiences great happiness or sadness in response to an event that we think should not warrant such a response.

Of the manner in which we judge of the propriety or impropriety of the affections of other men by their concord or dissonance with our own.

Smith presents the argument that approval or disapproval of the feelings of others is completely determined by whether we sympathize or fail to sympathize with their emotions. Specifically, if we sympathize with the feelings of another we judge that their feelings are just and if we do not sympathize we judge that their feelings are unjust.

This holds in matters of opinion also, as Smith flatly states that we judge the opinions of others as correct or incorrect merely by determining whether they agree with our own opinions. Smith also cites a few examples where our judgment is not in line with our emotions and sympathy, as when we judge the sorrow of a stranger who has lost her mother as being justified even though we know nothing about the stranger and do not sympathize ourselves. 

However, according to Smith these non-emotional judgments are not independent from sympathy in that although we do not feel sympathy we do recognize that sympathy would be appropriate and lead us to this judgment and thus deem the judgment as correct.

Smith puts forth that not only are the consequences of one's actions judged and used to determine whether one is just or unjust in committing them, but also whether one's sentiments justified the action that brought about the consequences. Thus, sympathy plays a role in determining judgments of the actions of others in that if we sympathize with the affections that brought about the action we are more likely to judge the action as just and vice versa.

In summary, it is useful to read the whole book to understand Smith's theory of moral sentiments for your own experience. The book is free for download under this link:
http://www.ibiblio.org/ml/libri/s/SmithA_MoralSentiments_p.pdf

Enjoy,

Anita H.